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Power-sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace
Abstract
Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups
are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power-sharing should therefore
reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on
whether formal power-sharing institutions effectively prevent large-scale
violence.We can improve our understanding of the effect of power-sharing
institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To
this effect, we compare the direct effect of formal power-sharing institu-
tions on peace with their indirect effect through power-sharing behavior.
Combining data on inclusive and territorially dispersive institutions with
information on power-sharing behavior, we empirically assess this relation-
ship on a global scale. Our causal mediation analysis reveals that formal
power-sharing institutions affect the probability of ethnic conflict onset
mostly through power-sharing behavior that these institutions induce.
Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required
to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of
Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: http:
//dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/3DK6JA.
Word Count: 8,982
Power-sharing institutions are a commonly prescribed means of fostering peace
in ethnically divided and otherwise fragile societies. They are designed to provide
political elites with incentives to share power, within the central government or
among federal units. In short, power-sharing institutions should induce behav-
ior that makes civil war less likely. Yet, the existing literature on power-sharing
has produced inconclusive or even contradictory results. Some empirical analyses
find that particular forms of power-sharing reduce the risk of violent conflict, but
they do not agree which types of power-sharing prove effective (e.g., Hartzell &
Hoddie 2003, Jarstad & Nilsson 2008, Mattes & Savun 2009). Other prominent
studies present evidence that power-sharing is either irrelevant or even detrimen-
tal (e.g., Roeder 2005, Toft 2010, Selway & Templeman 2012).
We argue that these contradictory findings result from paying insufficient at-
tention to the mechanisms through which formal power-sharing institutions affect
the likelihood of civil conflict onset. Conflict researchers generally assume that
formal power-sharing institutions induce cooperative behavior among political
elites, for example in coalition governments, thereby increasing the likelihood of
peace. Yet, existing studies rarely specify this causal chain and instead directly
link institutions to armed conflict. The causal chain from institutions to peace,
nonetheless, may be disrupted in three ways. First, formal power-sharing insti-
tutions may fail to induce the expected behavior. Second, even if institutions
generate the expected behavior, this behavior may not increase the likelihood of
peace. Third, formal power-sharing may affect the likelihood of peace indepen-
dently of behavioral practices, for example, by influencing expectations about
future cooperation. If any of these conditions apply, ignoring how formal power-
sharing institutions affect power-sharing practices is likely to lead to inconclusive
results.
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In this paper, we examine the causal chain from power-sharing institutions to
peace through power-sharing behavior. More specifically, we estimate the effect
of de jure power-sharing on power-sharing practices and their respective effects on
conflict onset.1 Based on these estimations, we employ causal mediation analysis
that allows us to assess whether formal power-sharing institutions influence the
likelihood of civil war onset indirectly through power-sharing practices, or whether
they exert an independent effect.
Our empirical findings suggest that particular forms of formal power-sharing
institutions affect particular behavioral practices, and thereby particular types
of conflict. For example, we find that inclusive power-sharing institutions that
enable diverse groups to gain access to government do indeed make governments
more ethnically inclusive, and that this practice of inclusion reduces the likeli-
hood of rebellions by excluded groups, but this comes at the cost of raising the
odds for infighting. By contrast, we find less evidence that formal power-sharing
institutions affect the likelihood of conflict through other means. Thus, by un-
tangling the sometimes offsetting relationships among specific types of power-
sharing institutions, various power-sharing practices, and different types of civil
war, our findings reconcile many of the conflicting claims about the effects of
power-sharing.
The next section briefly reviews the contradictory claims about the effects
of power-sharing on peace. We then discuss how formal institutions affect the
likelihood of civil war onset through their effect on power-sharing practices. After
1We also denote institutions as power-sharing rules or de jure power-sharing,
and similarly refer to behavior as power-sharing practices and de facto power-
sharing.
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introducing our data, we present the empirical tests and our findings regarding
the effects of Lijphart’s (2002, 39) “primary characteristics” of power-sharing,
namely power-sharing at the executive level (inclusion) and segmental autonomy
(dispersion). We conclude by discussing future steps in our research on formal
and informal power-sharing.
The literature on power-sharing and conflict
Much of the literature on power-sharing pays tribute to Lijphart’s (1969, 1975)
notion of consociationalism, which responded to scholars who questioned the via-
bility of democracy and stability in “plural societies” (e.g., Dahl 1971, Rabushka
& Shepsle 1972). Lijphart argued that the combination of a grand coalition, mu-
tual veto rights, segmental autonomy and proportionality should allow for the
peaceful coexistence of distinct social groups (see most recently, Martin 2013).2
Lijphart’s (1969, 1975) early writings conceived of consociationalism largely
as a set of behavioral practices of political elites (Andeweg 2000). For instance,
grand coalitions as practiced in Switzerland are not formally prescribed by the
constitution. Lijphart (1985, 158) himself noted that “[t]here is also a general
difference . . . between laying down the basic rules of power-sharing in formal
documents – such as constitutions, laws, or semi-public agreements – and relying
on merely informal and unwritten agreements and understandings among the
leaders of the segments.” Later, Lijphart and others turned their attention to
formal power-sharing institutions and their impact on outcomes such as conflict,
and economic and social performance (see, e.g., Lijphart 1999).
2Binningsbø (2013) provides an excellent review of this literature.
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This focus on formal institutions is at least partially rooted in the desire to
offer policy advice and the belief that institutions are often the most suitable
means (Lijphart 1985). If power-sharing practices have positive effects and can
be induced by power-sharing institutions, then scholars should try to understand
what institutions are most conducive to such practices. Yet most recent studies
of power-sharing institutions leapfrog the link between institutions and practices
such as elite cooperation in coalitions. Instead, conflict researchers usually eval-
uate a direct link from institutions to armed conflict, which implicitly assumes
that power-sharing behavior is affected by institutions and this in turn affects
the likelihood of fighting.
The lack of attention to power-sharing behavior is evident in the literature
on intrastate conflict. Research on civil war onset tends to focus on the impact
of electoral rules, parliamentary or presidential regimes, and the design of fed-
eral structures (e.g., Cohen 1997, Reynal-Querol 2002, Roeder 2005, Schneider &
Wiesehomeier 2008, Selway & Templeman 2012). In contrast, studies of conflict
recurrence spearheaded by Hartzell & Hoddie (2003) usually examine the indi-
vidual or joint effects of a mix of political, military, and territorial power-sharing
provisions in peace agreements (see Walter 2002, Mukherjee 2006, Hartzell &
Hoddie 2007, Jarstad & Nilsson 2008, Jarstad 2009, Mattes & Savun 2009, Mehler
2009, Martin 2013). Partly due to different operationalizations of power-sharing,
scholars have yet to reach consensus on its actual effects. Some scholars even ar-
gue that power-sharing institutions endanger peace by generating incentives for
ethnic outbidding and intransigence (Roeder 2005, Selway & Templeman 2012).
Many of these studies only examine the pacification effect on countries that have
experienced conflict.
In order to reach more definitive insights concerning the effects of power-
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sharing institutions on civil peace, we argue that three issues deserve particular
attention. First, it is necessary to understand the causal chain from institu-
tions to peace or conflict outcomes through behavior. Although existing research
notes the difference between de jure power-sharing provisions in peace agree-
ments and their de facto implementation (Hoddie & Hartzell 2003, Jarstad &
Nilsson 2008, Ottmann & Vüllers 2015, Strøm, Gates, Graham & Strand 2017),
our empirical understanding of the latter is still underdeveloped. For example,
Jarstad & Nilsson (2008, 215) find that about 75 % of political pacts contained
in peace agreements are implemented, but this percentage drops to 55 % for ter-
ritorial pacts, and 34.5 % for military pacts. Yet, most studies of civil war onset
and recurrence do not consider whether power-sharing rules result in cooperative
behavior (e.g., Reynal-Querol 2002, Hoddie & Hartzell 2003).
A second issue that could explain contradictory empirical findings concerns
the possibility that different kinds of power-sharing institutions may have differ-
ent effects on civil peace. Gates, Graham, Lupu, Strand & Strøm (2016) find that
only constraining power-sharing institutions significantly and robustly enhance
civil peace, whereas inclusive institutions have beneficial effects only in societies
that have recently undergone civil conflict. When evaluating institutional effects
we need to compare different types of power-sharing institutions. Finally, our
insights concerning these institutions and their effects should be tested against a
sufficiently broad and representative set of data. This is important because ex-
isting results might be unduly influenced by cases, such as post-conflict environ-
ments, that pose particularly difficult challenges for power-sharing institutions.
We address these three points in a global study of both pre-conflict and post-
conflict cases with Strøm et al.’s (2017) data on inclusive and dispersive power-
sharing institutions and Cederman, Wimmer & Min’s (2010) data on power-
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sharing practices. We thereby tackle a critical source of the conflicting evidence
regarding the effects of power-sharing on conflict: the lack of attention paid
to actual power-sharing behavior or practices, which arguably stems from the
difficulty of collecting such data.3
The lack of attention paid to behavioral practices obscures the causal mecha-
nisms that link institutions to peace and conflict outcomes. Formal power-sharing
institutions might fail to reduce the likelihood of civil war either because they
fail to induce power-sharing behavior, as the failed 1991 peace agreement in
Angola attests to (Doyle & Sambanis 2006, 3), or because the practices have
no conflict-reducing effect, as for example in Lebanon where the grand coali-
tion between Sunni, Shia, and Maronite Christians could not prevent civil war
in 1975 (Makdisi & Sadaka 2005, 61–63). Conversely, peace might result from
power-sharing practices induced by institutions or from direct institutional ef-
fects, which, for example, operate through increased citizen confidence or ex-
pectations of future implementation (see Hale 2008). It also remains difficult to
assess the effects of power-sharing behavior that occurs in the absence of formal
power-sharing rules – a not uncommon constellation.
On top of these challenges, studies of conflict recurrence fail to analyze multi-
ple cases of power-sharing in ethnically divided states such as Belgium that have
no history of armed conflict since 1945 (Lijphart 1977, 15). Similarly, states that
have experienced recent intrastate wars sometimes engage in power-sharing prac-
tices that are unrelated to the past conflict issue, such as the Nigerian arrange-
ment since 1999 of alternating the presidency between northerners and southern-
3Strøm et al. (2017) also provide some information on whether formal insti-
tutions were implemented.
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ers (Ibrahim 2007, 6). Thus, to account for these forms of accommodation we
must examine power-sharing practices globally and include practices that emerge
independently of peace agreements or other mandates.
Due to the lack of information on de facto power-sharing behavior, almost all
existing studies on power-sharing fail to trace the mechanisms that link power-
sharing institutions to civil war. A recent study by Cederman, Gleditsch &
Buhaug (2013) has begun to examine ethnic power-sharing behavior, but this
work has correspondingly paid less attention to formal institutions. By merging
these data on elite behavior with the previously mentioned data on power-sharing
institutions, we can explore in finer detail the causal pathway from power-sharing
institutions through behavior on the risk of ethnic civil war.
Power-sharing institutions and practices
We expect formal power-sharing institutions to affect conflict in large part through
their effects on practices of power-sharing between relevant ethnic groups. Indeed,
when scholars argue that formal power-sharing induces peace, it is primarily such
indirect or mediated effects they have in mind. However, formal power-sharing
institutions may also affect peace in other ways, for example, by altering expec-
tations about the future. If formal rules that promise future reserved legislative
seats for minority groups have been adopted, the expectation of future inclusion
may discourage armed rebellion, even if elections under those rules have yet to
take place and the minority group currently has no representation.4 Future ex-
4For a related argument about promises of autonomy and secession in the
former Soviet Union, see Hale (2008, Ch.4).
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pectations are particularly important during transitions when new formal rules
have not yet been implemented, or when rules previously in force have been tem-
porarily suspended, such as during a period of martial law. While we maintain
that the main effect of power-sharing institutions is mediated by practices, we
recognize that other effects, not mediated by current practices, may exist.
Which power-sharing institutions and practices are most effective in reducing
the likelihood of conflict? To answer this question, we use Strøm et al.’s (2017)
conceptualization and focus on those elements of power-sharing that Lijphart
(2002, 39) considers as “primary characteristics” (see also Lijphart 1995, 856):
the sharing of executive power and group autonomy. These two features closely
resemble two dimensions proposed by Strøm et al.’s (2017) conceptualization,
namely inclusive and dispersive power-sharing.5 Thus, inclusive institutional ar-
rangements mandate the participation of several parties or groups in particular
offices or decision-making processes. Closely aligned with core elements of Li-
jphart’s (1969, 1975) consociationalism, they range from reserved legislative or
executive positions for representatives of minority groups to mandates of military
inclusiveness. Dispersive power-sharing institutions distribute power by decen-
tralizing decisions across regions or sectors of society, such as federalism. They
delegate power away from the central government toward regional authorities and
5We focus on these “primary characteristics” and adopt a narrow definition
of their institutional elements to render our theoretical argument as precise and
explicit as possible. We explicitly do not consider such institutions as a propor-
tional representation electoral system or a parliamentary regime, as the former is
not part of the “primary characteristics” and as both are only remotely related
to Lijphart’s (1969, 1975) elements (“proportionality” and “grand coalition”).
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guarantee the autonomy of these governments as well as their accountability to
regional constituencies (see Gurr, Harff, Marshall & Scarritt 1993, Hechter 2000).
In the following, we identify the specific power-sharing behavior we expect
each type of institution to induce. Together with the effect of this behavior on
conflict they determine the indirect effect of the institution on conflict. We refer
to other mechanisms between institutions and conflict as direct effects but do not
model their specific content (see Imai, Keele, Tingley & Yamamoto 2011, 769).
Figure 1 summarizes the direct and the indirect effects of institutions on conflict,
which we discuss in more detail below.
Figure 1 about here.
Inclusive power-sharing institutions. The purpose of inclusive power-sharing
institutions is to enable diverse ethnic groups, particularly minorities, to gain ac-
cess to government power. Absent such power-sharing institutions, these groups
might not be adequately represented and therefore lack a say over policies that
affect them. Exclusion along ethnic lines triggered armed conflicts in Apartheid
South Africa, Assad’s Syria, Amhara-dominated Ethiopia before 1991, and racially
divided Guatemala (Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug 2013, 63&82). Often, in-
clusive power-sharing institutions explicitly require particular ethnic groups to
be represented in government, for example in Bosnia and Lebanon. Yet it is
not uncommon to find only general rules, for instance if minority parties have
to be included in the government even if they are not required to form a ma-
jority. Empirically, we expect to see a larger share of ethnic groups represented
in government in states with inclusive institutions that prescribe and implement
power-sharing behavior. Figure 1 depicts both this indirect effect and the direct
impact of inclusive institutions on the likelihood of conflict. Whereas Gates et al.
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(2016) find no evidence for an unmediated negative effect of inclusive institu-
tions on civil conflict, little is known about the indirect causal pathway through
power-sharing behavior. Although Cederman, Wimmer & Min (2010) find evi-
dence that inclusive practices reduce conflict, they also consider a large number
of power-sharing practices that exist independently of formal institutions (see
also Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug 2013). It thus remains unclear whether
institutions are really responsible for the lower risk of conflict.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Inclusive power-sharing institutions decrease the likelihood
of conflict onset by making governments ethnically more inclusive.
While this general hypothesis follows quite directly from recent research on
political inclusion and Lijphart’s (1969, 1975) path-breaking work, some of this
research also shows that more inclusive arrangements may heighten the tensions
within the government coalition. Wimmer, Cederman & Min (2009) distinguish
between civil wars among partners in power-sharing arrangements, i.e. infighting
as for example in Lebanon (Makdisi & Sadaka 2005), and those conflicts in which
an excluded group fights against the state. Roessler (2011, 2016) explores this
dynamic in Sudan and other Sub-Saharan African cases and argues that power-
sharing induces a commitment problem between individual coalition members,
who each want to rule alone. Put differently, power-sharing in the present does
not rule out defections by one of the power-sharing partners in the future (also
see Walter 2002, Dal Bó & Powell 2009). Lebanon’s extensive but failed power-
sharing regime between Maronites, Sunni, and Shi’a provides one tragic example
of infighting. Hence, we refine our first hypothesis to capture this more nuanced
effect of inclusive power-sharing and propose the two following sub-hypotheses:
Hypothesis (H1a). Inclusive power-sharing institutions decrease the likelihood
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of conflict onset between the government and politically excluded groups by making
governments more ethnically inclusive.
Hypothesis (H1b). Inclusive power-sharing institutions increase the likelihood
of conflict onset among the power-sharing partners by increasing the number of
ethnic groups in power.
Dispersive power-sharing institutions. Dispersive power-sharing institu-
tions increase the policy authority of subnational governments, as well as their
accountability to subnational constituencies. While dispersive institutions have
important effects on governance even in mono-ethnic societies, we here focus
specifically on the effect of dispersive institutions on regional autonomy for eth-
nic groups. Because ethnic groups are frequently regionally concentrated, regional
governments in multiethnic societies are likely to be controlled by specific ethnic
groups (e.g., Christin & Hug 2012). Thus, empowering such regional govern-
ments and devolving particular important policy authorities to the subnational
level make it likely that ethnic groups profit and gain regional autonomy. By
gaining political power through dispersive institutions, ethnic groups such as the
Acehnese in Indonesia should be less likely to rebel against the state (Cederman,
Hug, Schädel & Wucherpfennig 2015).
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Dispersive power-sharing institutions, by increasing regional
autonomy for ethnic minorities, decrease the likelihood of conflict onset.
Data and Method
To test our hypotheses, we combine two recent datasets that provide information
on inclusive and dispersive institutions as well as power-sharing behavior. The
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Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraints (IDC) dataset provides information on de
jure power-sharing institutions (Strøm et al. 2017), while the 2014 version of the
Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset captures information about the de facto
allocation of power among ethnic groups within each state (Cederman, Wimmer
& Min 2010, Vogt, Bormann, Ruegger, Cederman, Hunziker & Girardin 2015).
The IDC dataset offers annual data on 180 countries from 1975 through 2010.6
This broad coverage allows us to assess the effect of power-sharing institutions
in a global sample that includes states with and without a history of ethnic
conflicts, thus avoiding potential selection problems due to a focus on post-conflict
situations.7 The dataset contains nineteen indicators of power-sharing, each of
which is associated with one of the three dimensions of power-sharing that Strøm
et al. (2017) identify theoretically: inclusive, dispersive, and constraining.
Because we follow Lijphart in focusing on inclusive and dispersive power-
sharing, we focus on the eleven corresponding indicators. The measure of in-
clusive power-sharing thus incorporates two of Lijphart’s (1969) components of
consociationalism: grand coalitions and mutual veto. It also includes reserved
seats or executive positions for specific minority groups in the central government
and inclusiveness mandates for the armed forces.8 The indicators of dispersive
6All independent states with populations greater than 250,000 are included.
7This feature of the IDC is a decisive advantage as most other studies draw in-
ferences about the effects of power-sharing institutions by using information from
peace-agreements. The latter, however, are only adopted in post-war settings,
making broader inferences impossible. As other possible sources of selection bias
are possible, we will discuss these more in detail below.
8The indicators for inclusive institutions are “Mandated Grand Coalition or
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power-sharing cover three areas: (1) the powers allocated to sub-national gov-
ernments; (2) whether sub-national governments are directly elected; and (3) the
representation of sub-national constituencies in the upper house of the national
legislature. The powers of sub-national government are coded based on whether
state/provincial governments have the ability to levy their own taxes; whether
state/provincial governments have control over education policy;9 and whether
subnational governments control their own police/paramilitary forces.10 Based
on factor analysis, the indicators combine into two indices – one for inclusive and
one for dispersive power-sharing.11
Unity Government,” “Mutual Veto,” “Reserved Executive Positions,” “Reserved
Seats”, “Mandated Military Inclusiveness.”
9Education policy is of central concern with respect to powersharing because
this single issue area contains service provision and opportunities for patronage,
human capital development and the distribution of economic opportunity, as well
as control of cultural, historical, and political narratives that are often central to
political identities in multi-ethnic societies (Graham & Strøm 2014).
10The indicators for dispersive institutions are “Subnational Tax Author-
ity,” “Subnational Education Authority,” “Subnational Police Authority,”
“State/Provincial Executive Elections,” “State/Provincial Legislative Elections,”
and“Constituency Alignment (i.e. state/provincial representation in the upper
house.”
11More specifically, Strøm et al. (2017) conduct a factor analysis of indica-
tors of power-sharing institutions and find that these indicators indeed clus-
ter cleanly around three clearly interpretable latent variables: (1) inclusive,
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We measure power-sharing behavior by drawing on the EPR data, which com-
prises information about ethnic groups in all states where ethnicity is relevant
in national politics.12 The EPR dataset provides information on political in-
clusion of group representatives into the highest executive body of each state,
codes de facto regional autonomy, and provides data on group sizes relative to
the ethnically relevant population.13
The EPR data categorizes power-access at the center for ethnic groups accord-
ing to seven categories: the monopoly and dominant categories describe regimes
in which representatives from one ethnic group rule alone. Representatives of
groups with a senior- and junior-partner coding share power in multi-ethnic coali-
tions. All other groups, namely those considered to be powerless, discriminated or
self-excluded, are considered as being excluded from executive power.14 Members
of powerless groups simply do not enjoy inclusion at the center, while discrimi-
(2) dispersive, and (3) constraining power-sharing. For details on index cre-
ation and the underlying indicators, see the IDC Codebook, available online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/27961.
12The EPR codebook notes that “[an] ethnic group is considered politically
relevant if at least one political organization claims to represent it in national
politics. . . ” If no actor makes such claims, ethnic groups can still be in the data
if the state politically discriminates against them such as in Apartheid South-
Africa or in southern states in the United States under the Jim Crow regime (see
http://www.icr.ethz.ch/data/epr).
13Token membership by ethnic elites who cannot or do not effectively represent
a group does not qualify for an “inclusion” coding.
14The self-exclusion category captures a small number of groups that control a
14
nated groups face active, political persecution by the state such as the denial of
citizenship rights.
In addition, the EPR dataset also provides data on territorial autonomy re-
gardless of whether ethnic groups enjoy inclusion or exclusion into the central
executive (Cederman et al. 2015). An ethnic group has de facto regional auton-
omy when a “meaningful and active regional executive organ operates below the
state level but above the local administration, and group representatives exert
actual influence on the decisions of this entity, acting in line with the group’s
local interests” (Vogt et al. 2015, 1331).
Since the EPR dataset only offers information on power-sharing behavior if
at least two politically relevant ethnic groups exist in a state, we drop all ob-
servations from countries where ethnicity is not relevant. Restricting the sample
to those states where ethnicity plays an important role in politics is warranted
for two reasons. First, it is in line with our theoretical focus on the effects of
power-sharing institutions on ethnic conflict as mediated by respective power-
sharing practices. Ethnic conflicts do not happen in countries in which there are
no politically relevant ethnic groups.15 Second, we do not lose many cases as
particular territory of the state, which they have declared independent from the
central government.
15 This obviously does not shield us from concerns raised by Hug (2010, 2013)
that some ethnic groups might be “politically relevant,” but, due to missing
information, not be part of the EPR data (see also Weidmann 2015). These
concerns, however, are unlikely to affect our results. Omitted “politically rele-
vant” ethnic groups, or only socially relevant ethnic groups (see Birnir, Laitin,
Wilkenfeld, Waguespack, Hultquist & Gurr 2018), would only increase the num-
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EPR classifies ethnicity as politically relevant in 141 states out of an overall pop-
ulation of 165 countries with a population greater than 500,000 (Vogt et al. 2015,
1336).16
Our unit of analysis is the country-year for two main reasons. First, our data
on power-sharing institutions are coded at the country level. Second, and more
importantly, the alternative of identifying the observations by ethnic group is not
feasible since not all power-sharing institutions formally apply to ethnic groups.
For instance, the Constitution of Fiji of 1997 requires the prime minister to form
a multiparty cabinet. Depending on the composition of the parliament, this may
lead to ethnic groups being explicitly integrated in a government, though this is
not explicitly required (Fraenkel 2006, 321). Thus, in assigning particular insti-
tutional provisions to particular ethnic groups would be fraught with difficulties.
Country-year analysis is likely to lead to conservative estimates as not all ethnic
groups (in the case of provisions targeting explicitly such groups) are likely to
profit from power-sharing. Many extant studies likely also report conservative
estimates of the effect of power-sharing as these studies predominantly adopt the
same strategy.
ber of observations from countries with no ethnic conflict and most likely no
power-sharing institutions (as many of these target ethnic groups specifically).
For the countries covered, however, the concerns of misclassificatons raised by
Hug (2010, 2013) might be a problem. As we use a conflict coding based on
low intensity levels (25 battle deaths), (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollen-
berg & Strand 2002, Themnér & Wallensteen 2014, for more, see below) this is,
however, unlikely to affect our results.
16Table A1 in the appendix lists all country-years covered in the analyses.
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Our dependent variable armed conflict onset derives from the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Database (ACD), which codes a new civil war when at least
25 battle-deaths have occurred during a calendar year (Gleditsch et al. 2002,
Themnér & Wallensteen 2014). We thus employ a minimalist definition of peace,
that is, the absence of civil war. In order to distinguish new civil wars from
dormant conflicts, we code a new onset only if governments and rebels did not
fight each other for two years.17 We identify civil wars as ethnic whenever
rebel groups claim to fight on behalf of and recruit from a specific ethnic group
(Wucherpfennig, Metternich, Cederman & Gleditsch 2012).
To empirically capture power-sharing behavior, we aggregate de facto inclu-
sion and territorial dispersion of power from the group-level EPR data to the
country-level. We measure de facto central power-sharing as the share of a coun-
try’s politically relevant groups included in the government if the government con-
sists of at least two groups. This operationalization includes any power-sharing
government that is multiethnic, and assigns a higher value to those governments
where a greater share of the ethnic groups in their countries are represented.
In contrast, any government that includes leaders from only one ethnic group
receives a de facto inclusion score of 0 even if it represents a large part of the
population such as the Erdogan government in Turkey, which represents many
Turks, but not the Kurdish population.18
17We keep country-years with ongoing conflicts in the analysis as in the course
of one conflict another civil war between the government and another non-state
actor might still erupt. Dropping the observations of ongoing conflicts does not
affect our substantial results.
18We have explored a series of other operationalizations, including a dummy
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We proceed in a similar manner to measure de facto dispersive power-sharing.
Rather than adding up the share of included groups, we aggregate the share of
the population belonging to ethnic groups with regional autonomy. As the EPR
data codes regional autonomy only for groups that do not enjoy dominance or
monopoly power at the center, our operationalization reflects whether the center
shares power with at least one other peripheral group.
Since we wish to assess both the direct and indirect effect of power-sharing in-
stitutions, we draw on Imai et al. (2011) and their framework for causal mediation
analysis (for a related discussion, see Bullock, Green & Ha 2010).19 Our goal is
to assess our theoretical expectation that the effects of power-sharing institutions
on civil war risk mainly run through power-sharing behavior. Mediation analysis
allows us to do exactly that. In contrast, a commonly used alternative strategy,
employing interaction effects between institutions and practices, would not al-
low us to assess our hypotheses, as the estimated coefficients would only tell us
indicator of whether one or more than one ethnic group is in government, a
variable that corresponds to the population share of ethnic groups represented
in government if they are at least two (and 0 otherwise), and finally simply the
population share of ethnic groups represented in government. We also restricted
our classification of power-sharing to those governments that only represent a
majority of the population. The substantive conclusions from all these analyses
are identical to the ones presented below.
19Bullock, Green & Ha’s (2010) critique causal mediation analysis in experi-
mental settings due to the untestable assumptions on which it builds. We address
this criticism by employing sensitivity analysis developed by Imai et al. (2011)
and present the result in our appendix.
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whether one variable moderates the influence of another, but not through what
channels institutions affect conflict. The institutional powersharing literature
implicitly assumes that institutions, through practices, affect policy outcomes.
Mediation analysis is necessary to evaluate whether this assumption is valid.
To test our hypotheses, we estimate two regressions: first, a linear model that
assesses the effect of institutions on behavior, and second, a logit model that esti-
mates the effect of institutions and behavior on ethnic conflict onset. Using these
models we then carry out a causal mediation analysis to assess whether institu-
tions influence conflict directly or indirectly through power-sharing behavior, or
not at all.
The underlying logic of such an analysis for linear models is to draw on stan-
dardzed regressions coefficients to estimate the effects of the paths depicted in
Figure 1 (see, Asher 1983). More specifically, to estimate the mediated effect of
institutions on conflict, the product of the standardized coefficients for the effect
of institutions on practices and for the effect of practices on conflict is used. This
estimate of the mediated effect can be subtracted from the total effect (which
corresponds to the standardized coefficient for the effect of institutions on con-
flict) to estimate the direct, i.e., unmediated, effect. Thus, in our case, causal
mediation uses the estimated regression coefficients to partition the total effect
of institutions on conflict into (1) the partial effect that is mediated through
practices, and (2) a remaining effect, referred to as the direct effect.20 According
20We follow Imai et al. (2011, 769) in our analysis and also define the average
direct effect (ADE) as the difference in outcomes between cases where the treat-
ment (institutions) is present and those where it is absent holding the mediator
(behavior) constant. The average causal mediation effect (ACME) is the differ-
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to Imai, Tingley & Yamamoto (2013, 7), who generalize mediation analysis to
cover many non-linear models (which we employ), direct effects derive from “all
other possible mechanisms,” or simply all those not mediated by power-sharing
practices.
Our selection of control variables follows standard practices in the literature.
Among the most robust predictors of civil war are GDP per capita and a country’s
population size (Sambanis 2002). To account for time dependence, we consider
the number of prior civil wars and a cubic polynomial of time since the last
conflict (Carter & Signorino 2010). Moreover, we add dummies for French or
British colonial legacy to partially mitigate endogeneity concerns (for the role of
colonial heritage and civil wars, see also Blanton, Mason & Athow 2001). Ex-
isting research demonstrates that colonial heritage affects the design and type of
country’s political institutions and variation in colonial heritage to address en-
dogeneity concerns (Christin & Hug 2012, Cederman et al. 2015, Wucherpfennig,
Hunziker & Cederman 2016). Finally, we add an indicator variable for all cases in
which some of the underlying institutional indicators are missing (Greene 2003,
60).
Empirical analysis
Our first analysis investigates the link among inclusive power-sharing institutions,
inclusive power-sharing practices, and ethnic conflict onset. In the first column
of Table 1, we report the estimated effects of inclusive institutions on de facto
ence in outcomes given changes in the mediator holding the treatment constant.
See Equations (1) and (2) in Imai et al. (2011).
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inclusion – i.e. on the share of ethnic groups represented in the central govern-
ment, based on a linear regression model. In the second column, we report the
estimated effects of both inclusive institutions and de facto inclusion on conflict
onset stemming from a probit model.
The results of the first model are as expected: inclusive institutions signifi-
cantly increase the share of ethnic groups included in power-sharing governments.
This is evidence that inclusive institutions work as they are designed to in at
least one key respect – they make inclusive power-sharing behavior more likely
and more encompassing. We also find that countries with a British or French
colonial past are more likely to have a larger share of ethnic groups included in
government, while in larger countries this is less the case. Results for the second
model are less in line with our expectations. Here, our estimation generates only
a small and statistically insignificant negative coefficient of de facto inclusion on
ethnic war onset. While inclusive institutions induce power-sharing behavior, we
do not find a similarly strong effect of power-sharing behavior on the likelihood
of ethnic civil war. The estimated coefficient for the effect of power-sharing insti-
tutions on ethnic conflict turns out to be positive, though this coefficient is also
small and statistically insignificant.
Table 1 about here.
We follow up the results in Table 1 with a causal mediation analysis, the
results of which, namely the mediated maximum effect through behavior and the
direct maximum effect of institutions, as well as the total effect of the latter, are
shown in Figure 2. These maximum effects correspond to the differences between
a situation where the institutional variable is set to its minimum and a situation
where it set at its maximum. We find little evidence of any mediated effect of
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inclusive institutions on ethnic civil war onset. Although, as predicted by our
first hypothesis, the estimated average mediated effect (ACME) is negative, it is
small and statistically insignificant. The estimated average direct effect (ADE)
of inclusive power-sharing institutions is actually positive, i.e. it increases the
risk of civil war, though this also fails to reach statistical significance.21
Figure 2 about here.
One possible explanation for this null effect of inclusive institutions on civil
war is that there are actually two offsetting effects at play, and these combine
to produce a null net effect. H1a and H1b take into account this possibility by
postulating that inclusive institutions indeed have diverging effects on different
types of ethnic conflict. Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 report the results of models
that distinguish between governmental conflicts due to infighting among ethnic
groups within a governing coalition and those pitting an excluded group against
the government using the same empirical specification as above.22 Thus, column
three reports the estimated effects of inclusive institutions and de facto inclu-
sion on fighting between ethnic groups that share power in government. Column
four reports the results of this same regression, but instead looks at conflict be-
tween the government and ethnic groups outside of government as the dependent
21As the distribution of the variable of inclusive power-sharing institutions is
severely skewed, we carried out the same analyses as above with a dichotomous
indicator of whether at least one power-sharing element is present. The results
lead to exactly the same substantive conclusions.
22For a similar analysis, focusing on authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan
Africa, see Roessler (2011, 2016).
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variable.
The results reported in Models 3 and 4 in Table 1 now reveal what our initial
results based on a pooled conflict indicator could not: de facto inclusion increases
the likelihood of one type of ethnic conflict while at the same time it reduces the
likelihood of another type. In Model 3 we see that more inclusive power-sharing
behavior, i.e. a larger share of ethnic groups represented in the central government
increases the probability of civil conflict between coalition members. Conversely,
in Model 4, we see that greater de facto inclusion leads to a lower incidence of
conflicts between the government and excluded groups.23 Thus, the larger the
share of ethnic groups represented in an inclusive power-sharing arrangement,
the likelier a conflict among these partners is. At the same time, more inclusion
significantly decreases the likelihood of a conflict with excluded groups. Inclusive
power-sharing practices do not significantly reduce the likelihood of ethnic conflict
overall, but they do alter the nature of the conflict that occurs.
We depict the estimated effects resulting from the corresponding mediation
analyses in Figure 3. The two panels of this figure show that inclusive institutions
have no direct effect on ethnic conflict, but do have an indirect effect mediated
by practices. Importantly, the direction of this effect depends on the type of
conflict we consider, i.e. whether we focus on infighting or rebellions. These
23Strictly speaking the two models dealing with conflict among power-sharing
partners and against excluded groups are obviously linked. For this reason we
report in the appendix in Table C1 the results of a multinomial probit model
(Imai & van Dyk 2005a, 2005b). While some small differences appear, the
substantive insights regarding power-sharing remain the same. For this reason
we retain the two probit models for the remainder of this study.
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opposing effects suggest a trade-off and explain why we failed to uncover a rela-
tionship among inclusive institutions and practices and conflict onset in our first
analysis, which did not distinguish between the two types of conflict. It is likely
that previous studies of the link between inclusive power-sharing and civil war
also reported inconclusive results due to these two opposing effects of inclusive
institutions (see Roessler 2011, 2016).
Figure 3 about here.
Figure 4 about here.
Having identified two countervailing effects of inclusive power-sharing on civil
war, we now assess the relative importance of these effects at the substantive
level. In Figure 4 we report on the horizonal axis the values of our measure
of inclusive power-sharing institutions, which stem, as discussed above, from a
factor analysis. The lowest value, close to zero, corresponds to cases where none
of the formal rules for inclusive power-sharing (discussed on page 12) exist. The
hightest value, slightly above 7, corresponds to cases where all these rules are
present. Figure 4 depicts the relevant information regarding the countervailing
effects of inclusive power-sharing in two different ways. First, the mediated effect
on the two types of conflict is reported as a function of the level of inclusive
power-sharing institutions (left panel, 95 % confidence intervals depicted in grey).
More precisely, instead of reporting only the maximum causal mediation effect,
as in figure 3, we depict this latter effect for a continuum of changes in the
“treatment,” i.e., for different levels of inclusive institutions. Second, based on
these causal mediation effects we generated changes in predicted probabilities
(and their 95% confidence intervals, depicted in grey) of conflict onset (right
panel). More specifically, for each observation we held all variables constant at
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their sample values and only changed the predicted value of the mediator (i.e.,
power-sharing practices) due to the change in the treatment (i.e., power-sharing
institutions).24
In both figures, we see that coalition infighting (solid line) and conflict with
excluded groups (dotted line) are affected to a similar extent. For instance, if
inclusive institutions were at their maximum, our model predicts that the prob-
ability of infighting in each country-year increases by 0.023 percentage points on
average. The same change leads to a decrease in the average probability of a
conflict against excluded groups by 0.017 percentage points. These changes also
relate to the frequency of the two types of conflict, as the number of governmen-
tal conflicts among partners of power-sharing arrangements is small (15), while
conflicts involving politically excluded groups are more numerous (35). Because
governmental ethnic conflicts are fortunately rare, even these small changes in
probabilities are substantively significant.25
24Thus, we calculated these probabilities by drawing on Gelman & Hill’s (2007)
proposal to generate “average predicted differences” in probabilities based on the
sample values of the remaining covariates (see also Hanmer & Kalkan 2013). Con-
sequently, we used the simulated mediated effects and combined these with the
estimated coefficients of the conflict equation and let the degree of inclusiveness
vary from its minimum to its maximum.
25As much of the literature on power-sharing and conflict deals with post-war
settlements, we have also carried out analyses distinguishing between the effects
in situations with no previous war and those with such previous conflicts. The
direction of the effects in these two cases remain identical, however, we observe an
attenuation effect in cases where no previous war had occurred (see appendix for
25
Table 2 about here.
Moving to our second hypothesis we assess whether dispersive power-sharing
institutions increase the population of ethnic groups with regional autonomy and
thereby decreases the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset. Employing the same
empirical setup used in the test of H1 with a linear and a probit model, Models 5
and 7 in Table 2 show that dispersive institutions increase regional autonomy
for ethnic groups. Contrary to inclusion, we find that British and French ex-
colonies have smaller shares of the population of ethnic groups enjoying regional
autonomy (see Cederman et al. 2015). Prior conflict in the country and the size
of the country increase this share, while in richer countries the extent of regional
autonomy is smaller. With respect to the effects of dispersive power-sharing on
conflict (Models 6 and 8), we distinguish between all ethnic civil wars and those
that are only fought over territory. For both outcomes, we find that lower ethnic
regional autonomy implies a slightly lower risk of conflict onset. In contrast, the
estimated coefficient for dispersive institutions is slightly positive for both types
of conflict. Notably, all of these effects fail to reach statistical significance.
Figure 5 about here.
The more nuanced results from causal mediation analysis reveal that disper-
sive institutions decrease the risk of civil war indirectly through increasing the
proportion of ethnic groups that enjoy regional autonomy. While the mediated
effect of dispersive institutions on ethnic conflict onset in general is statistically
the results). As these analyses focus on a much smaller set of cases and generate
issues of quasi-complete separation, we refrain from exploring this interesting
attenuation effect in more detail here.
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significant, the estimated effect on ethnic territorial conflict barely misses signifi-
cance. For both types of conflict, the direct effect is positive but statistically not
significant (see Figure 5).26
Discussion
Our analyses provide considerable evidence that de jure power-sharing institu-
tions affect the likelihood of ethnic conflicts by influencing civil war through
power-sharing practices. Using causal mediation analysis, we find little support
for formal institutions having an effect on conflict except through their impact
on power-sharing practices. More specifically, if we consider de jure inclusive
institutions, we can show that these affect power-sharing practices and thus in-
crease, respectively decrease, the probability of infighting, respectively of conflicts
against excluded groups. Also, when we look at the substantive effects of de jure
dispersive institutions as mediated by practices, we find again that the probability
of conflicts decreases.
These results hinge on two important assumptions. First, our analysis, as
most observational studies, assumes conditional independence, which might be vi-
26Following up on Cederman et al.’s (2015) finding, we estimated these models
again for cases with no previous war and those with previous conflict experiences.
We find again similar results with an important exception, namely that dispersive
institutions appear to affect positively the autonomy of ethnic groups only in cases
with previous war experiences. The total effect of institutions on conflict remains,
nevertheless, largely similar. For this reason we do not explore this peculiarity in
more detail here and report the results in the appendix.
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olated by the possible endogeneity of both power-sharing institutions and power-
sharing practices. As in other studies we attempt to mitigate this problem in the
main analysis by controlling for variables that are likely to influence both power-
sharing institutions and practices, like colonial heritage (see Wucherpfennig, Hun-
ziker & Cederman 2016). In the appendix we report on a series of analyses that
include additional control variables, including a measure of democracy(note, how-
ever, works on autocratic power-sharing, see Gandhi 2008, Magaloni 2008, Svolik
2012), which might be linked to the presence of power-sharing institutions, that
yield, however, largely similar results. To assess whether reverse causality might
affect our results we also report in the appendix analyses for which we lagged our
main dependent variables. Again our main findings remain intact.
As mediation analysis also allows for an explicit sensitivity analysis based on
the correlation of the error terms of our two equations (one explaining practices,
the other conflict), we also assess how large this correlation would need to be to
lead us to reject our hypotheses. As our analyses in the appendix show, while
some larger values for these correlations would make our results go away, the
required signs of these correlations are much less plausible. This relates to our
argument that if our results are biased, the biases should reduce the size of our
coefficients and thus lead to weaker support for our hypotheses. First, we focus
only on countries and years where power-sharing could effectively be deployed
among ethnic groups. We do not consider how power-sharing institutions might
also induce peace among actors who are separated by non-ethnic cleavages. Sec-
ond, power-sharing institutions and practices are likely to be adopted especially
in situations where tensions are so high that conflict is likely. Yet, if anything,
this should tend to bias the results against our hypotheses, reducing the negative
correlation between power-sharing institutions and subsequent civil war (evidence
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for this mitigating effect appears in Cederman et al. 2015, Wucherpfennig, Hun-
ziker & Cederman 2016).
The second assumption concerns the specification of the correct causal order.
Most scholars would readily support our claim that power-sharing institutions
affect conflict outcomes through power-sharing behavior. Others argue, however,
that this relationship is far more complex because actors choose the institutional
rules under which they govern. Pepinsky (2014), for example, explores this hy-
pothesis with respect to power-sharing in dictatorships. We are not able to settle
this debate here. Instead, we probe the causal order assumption empirically by
reversing institutions and behavior in our main empirical models. More specifi-
cally, we re-estimate our models by considering power-sharing institutions as the
mediator and power-sharing practices as the treatment for the analyses that un-
derlie the causal mediation results depicted in Figures 4 (inclusive power-sharing)
and 5 (dispersive power-sharing),27 and present the results in Figure 6.
Figure 6 about here.
The four panels in Figure 6 display a striking commonality. Throughout,
the average causal mediated effects are systematically small and the confidence
intervals include zero. At the same time, the effects of power-sharing practices
that are not mediated by formal institutions (direct effects in Figure 6) are sys-
tematically larger and the confidence intervals systematically exclude the value
of zero, with the single (and only partial) exception of the effect of autonomy
on territorial conflict. This suggests that the effect of power-sharing practices
cannot be explained as being mediated by power-sharing institutions. Quite to
27We keep the exact same set of control variables.
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the contrary, when we consider practices as being causally prior, the effects of
these practices are almost entirely of a direct nature.
Substantively, we find that our estimated effects are in the expected direction.
Inclusion increases the likelihood of infighting among power-sharing partners,
while reducing the probability that an excluded group engages in a conflict. This
finding to some extent probably explains some of the mixed results regarding the
pacifying effects of power sharing. Finally, regional autonomy granted to groups
excluded from central power-sharing decreases the likelihood of ethnic conflict in
general and territorial conflict in particular, but the latter effect is not statistically
significant.
Conclusion
Our results do much to clarify previously conflicting findings in the literature. In
particular, our nuanced analysis of de jure inclusive power-sharing institutions
reveals that these institutions, working primarily through inclusion of excluded
groups, reduce the effects of conflict against excluded groups, but simultaneously
increase the risk of fighting within government coalitions. Previous research gen-
erally did not distinguish between these two types of conflict. The failure to detect
that the associated effects offset one another has led scholars to disagree about
the effect of inclusive power-sharing on civil war onset (Lijphart 1977, Selway
& Templeman 2012). Finally, our results demonstrate that de jure territorially
dispersive power-sharing institutions have only weak effects on ethnic conflict,
though there is some evidence that dispersion may decrease the likelihood of eth-
nic conflict in general, and territorial conflicts in particular, by increasing the
population share of ethnic groups profiting from regional autonomy.
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This research takes an important step toward identifying the mechanisms
through which de jure power-sharing institutions affect conflict – something of
substantive importance to practitioners seeking to induce peace in conflict-riven
societies. Our findings are generally optimistic about the pacifying effect of
power-sharing institutions.. Thus, while we demonstrate that power-sharing pre-
dominantly affects the likelihood of conflict through practices, establishing the
conditions under which these effects are most pronounced is beyond the scope of
this paper.
Also, research remains to be done on how political accomodation induces
different social actors to behave peacefully. In the main, the institutions and
practices examined in this paper directly benefit the leaders of vulnerable ethnic
groups, offering them political influence, perquisites, and mutual security. But
civil peace also depends on whether ordinary citizens in these (and other) groups
gain protection from repression and exploitation. When such protection is on
offer, otherwise vulnerable individuals are less likely to join or support insurgency
movements, and the leaders of such movements will find it more costly to take
up arms (Gates et al. 2016). Consistent with Gates et al. (2016), we find no
significant direct effects for the two forms of institutional power-sharing examined
here. The conditions under which power-sharing accords offer such protection to
ordinary citizens in vulnerable groups are therefore a promising avenue for further
research.
Future empirical research could also most likely profit from a disaggregated
perspective by focusing on ethnic-group-years as units of analysis. As our analysis
of inclusive institutions shows, however, this also raises considerable issues of
interdependence. Wucherpfennig (2011) shows that power-sharing offers may
well be made strategically to a subset of groups. How institutions affect this
31
strategic behavior is an important topic for future research. The implication for
institutional design is profound.
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Dal Bó, Ernesto & Robert Powell. 2009. “A Model of Spoils Politics.” American
Journal of Political Science 53(1):207–222.
Doyle, Michael W. & Nicholas Sambanis. 2006. Making War and Building Peace:
United Nations Peace Operations. New York, NY: Princeton University
Press.
Fraenkel, Jon. 2006. Power Sharing in Fiji and New Caledonia. In Globalisation
and Governance in the Pacific Islands, ed. Stewart Firth. Canberra, AU:
ANU E Press pp. 317–348.
Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. Politicial Institutions under Dictatorship. New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press.
Gates, Scott, Benjamin A.T. Graham, Yonatan Lupu, H̊avard Strand & Kaare
Strøm. 2016. “Powersharing, Protection, and Peace.” Journal of Politics
78(2):512–526.
34
Gelman, Andrew & Jennifer Hill. 2007. Data Analysis Using Regression and
Multilevel/Hierarchical Models. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg
& Havard Strand. 2002. “Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset.”
Journal of Peace Research 39(5):615–637.
Graham, Benjamin A.T. & Kaare Strøm. 2014. “Variations in Federalism: Ex-
plaining Subnational Policy Authority.” Available at SSRN Available at:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2533599.
Greene, William H. 2003. Econometric Analysis (Fifth Edition). New York, NY:
Prentice Hall.
Gurr, Ted .R., Barbara Harff, M.G. Marshall & J.R. Scarritt. 1993. Minorities at
Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts. Washington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace Press.
Hale, Henry E. 2008. The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States
and Nations in Eurasia and the World. New York, NY: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Hanmer, Michael J. & K. Ozan Kalkan. 2013. “Behind the Curve: Clarifying the
Best Approach to Calculating Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects
from Limited Dependent Variable Models.” American Journal of Political
Science 57(1):263–277.
Hartzell, Caroline A. & Matthew Hoddie. 2003. “Institutionalizing Peace: Power
Sharing and Post-civil Conflict Management.” American Journal of Political
Science 47(2):318–332.
35
Hartzell, Caroline A. & Matthew Hoddie. 2007. Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing
Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. University Park,
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Hechter, Michael. 2000. Containing Nationalism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Hoddie, Matthew & Caroline Hartzell. 2003. “Civil War Settlements and the
Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements.” Journal of Peace
Research 40(3):303–320.
Hug, Simon. 2010. “The Effect of Misclassifications in Probit Models. Monte
Carlo Simulations and Applications.” Political Analysis 18(1):78–102.
Hug, Simon. 2013. “The Use and Misuse of the “Minorities at Risk” Project.”
Annual Review of Politial Science 16:191–208.
Ibrahim, Jibrin. 2007. “Nigeria’s 2007 Elections - The Fitful Path to Democratic
Citizenship.” United States Institute of Peace Special Report 182. https:
//www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr182.pdf
Imai, Kosuke & David A. van Dyk. 2005a. “A Bayesian Analysis of the Multino-
mial Probit Model Using the Data Augmentation.” Journal of Econometrics
124(2):311–334.
Imai, Kosuke & David A. van Dyk. 2005b. “MNP: R Package for Fitting the
Multinomial Probit Model.” Journal of Statistical Software 14(3):1–32.
Imai, Kosuke, Dustin Tingley & Teppei Yamamoto. 2013. “Experimental Designs
for Identifying Causal Mechanisms.” Journal of the Royal Statisical Society,
Series A 176:5–51.
36
Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele, Dustin Tingley & Teppei Yamamoto. 2011. “Unpack-
ing the Black Box: Learning about Causal Mechanisms from Experimental
and Observational Studies.” American Political Science Review 105(4):765–
789.
Jarstad, Anna K. 2009. “The Prevalence of Power-Sharing: Exploring the Pat-
terns of Post-Election Peace.” Africa Spectrum 44(3):41–62.
Jarstad, Anna K. & Desirée Nilsson. 2008. “From Words to Deeds: The imple-
mentation of Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords.” Conflict Management
and Peace Science 25:208–223.
Lijphart, Arend. 1969. “Consociational Democracy.” World Politics 21(2):207–
225.
Lijphart, Arend. 1975. The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy
in the Netherlands. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Explo-
ration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lijphart, Arend. 1985. Power-Sharing in South Africa. Berkeley, CA: Institute
of International Studies, University of California.
Lijphart, Arend. 1995. Multiethnic Democracy. In The Encycolpedia of Democ-
racy, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset. Washington: Congressional Quarterly.
Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Perfor-
mance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lijphart, Arend. 2002. The Wave of Power Sharing Democracy. In The Ar-
chitecture of Democracy: Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and
37
Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century, ed. Andrew Reynolds. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press pp. 37–54.
Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. “Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Author-
itarian Rule.” Comparative Political Studies 41(4-5):715–741.
Makdisi, Samir & Richard Sadaka. 2005. The Lebanese Civil War, 1975–90. In
Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis Vol.2, ed. Paul Collier &
Nicholas Sambanis. Washington, DC: World Bank pp. 59–85.
Martin, Philip A. 2013. “Coming Together: Power-Sharing and the Durability of
Negotiated Peace Settlements.” Civil Wars 15(3):332–358.
Mattes, Michaela & Burcu Savun. 2009. “Fostering Peace After Civil War: Com-
mitment Problems and Agreement Design.” International Studies Quarterly
53(3):737–759.
Mehler, Andreas. 2009. “Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious
Relationship.” African Affairs 108(432):453–473.
Mukherjee, Bumba. 2006. “Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to
Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, but Not Others?” Inter-
national Studies Quarterly 50(2):479–504.
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Tables
Table 1: Inclusive Institutions and Ethnic Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict Against
Inclusion All Ethnic Conflicts Infighting Excluded Group
Inclusive Institutions 0.090∗ 0.023 0.018 0.033
(0.007) (0.051) (0.083) (0.088)
De Facto Inclusion −0.023 1.138∗ −0.618∗
(0.134) (0.344) (0.222)
Log(GDP Per Capita) −0.023 −0.294∗ −0.446 −0.369∗
(0.012) (0.100) (0.246) (0.162)
Log(Population) −0.058∗ 0.209∗ −0.201 −0.091
(0.010) (0.080) (0.248) (0.128)
Prior Conflicts −0.004 0.076∗ 0.075 0.009
(0.003) (0.014) (0.056) (0.028)
British Colony 0.204∗ −0.198 −4.207 −0.161
(0.015) (0.126) (202.772) (0.213)
French Colony 0.340∗ 0.083 −0.566∗ 0.318
(0.016) (0.128) (0.282) (0.173)
Institution missing data −0.069∗ 0.119 0.049 0.135
(0.012) (0.096) (0.261) (0.152)
Peace Years 0.008∗ −0.018 0.023 −0.024
(0.002) (0.020) (0.049) (0.030)
Peace Years2 −0.000∗ 0.001 −0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Peace Years3 0.000∗ −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.707∗ −2.507∗ −0.505 −0.381
(0.084) (0.691) (1.934) (1.091)




AIC 953.724 154.862 368.822
BIC 1257.071 458.208 672.168
` −428.862 −29.431 −136.411
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Table 2: Dispersive Institutions and Ethnic Conflict Onset
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome Variable: Autonomy Ethnic Conflict Autonomy Territorial Conflict
Dispersive Institutions 0.009∗ 0.063 0.009∗ 0.096
(0.001) (0.063) (0.001) (0.080)
Autonomous Pop. Share −1.277 −1.004
(0.744) (0.821)
Log(GDP per capita) −0.008∗ −0.291∗ −0.005∗ −0.255
(0.002) (0.103) (0.002) (0.134)
Log(Population) 0.013∗ 0.214∗ 0.013∗ 0.385∗
(0.002) (0.086) (0.002) (0.108)
British Colony −0.013∗ −0.277∗ −0.013∗ −0.145
(0.003) (0.128) (0.003) (0.155)
French Colony −0.010∗ 0.037 −0.010∗ 0.033
(0.003) (0.122) (0.003) (0.181)
Prior Conflicts 0.005∗ 0.081∗ 0.004∗ 0.056∗
(0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.016)
Peace Years 0.001∗ −0.002 0.001 −0.025
(0.000) (0.020) (0.001) (0.025)
Peace Years2 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Peace Years3 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institution missing data −0.001 0.138 −0.001 0.104
(0.002) (0.099) (0.002) (0.129)
Constant −0.059∗ −2.531∗ −0.069∗ −3.802∗
(0.018) (0.740) (0.018) (0.976)
N 4,104 4,104 4,104 4,104
R2 0.098 0.090
adj. R2 0.096 0.088




Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Figures
Figure 1: Direct and Indirect Effects of Power-Sharing Institutions.
de jure inclusive/dispersive institutions
de facto inclusion/autonomy
?
Cederman et al (2010, 2013, 2015):
negative effects



























Figure 2: Maximum Effects of Inclusive Power-Sharing Institutions (Mediated
by the Share of Ethnic Groups in Power-Sharing Coalitions) on Ethnic Conflict
Onset










Figure 3: Maximum Effects of Inclusive Power-Sharing Institutions (Mediated
by the Share of Ethnic Groups in Power-Sharing Coalitions) on Ethnic Conflict
Onset



















Figure 4: Effects of Inclusive Power-Sharing Institutions (Mediated by the Share
of Ethnic Groups in Power-Sharing Coalitions) on Ethnic Conflict Onset with 95%
Confidence Intervals
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Figure 5: Maximum Effects of Dispersive Power-Sharing Institutions (Mediated
by Population Share of Autonomous Ethnic Groups) on Ethnic Conflict Onset



















Figure 6: Maximum Effects of Power-Sharing Practices Mediated by Power-
Sharing Institutions on Ethnic Conflict Onset
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In Table A1 we list the countries and time-periods covered in our empirical anal-
yses, while A2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used. Figure A1
shows the distribution of de jure powersharing in both democracies and non-
democracies.
Table A1: Countries and years covered in the analysis
country min(year) max(year) country min(year) max(year)
Afghanistan 1975 2002 Kyrgyzstan 1992 2009
Albania 1990 2009 Laos 1975 2009
Algeria 1975 1991 Latvia 1992 2009
Angola 2003 2008 Lebanon 1975 2009
Argentina 1978 2009 Liberia 1975 2009
Armenia 1992 2009 Libya 2007 2009
Australia 1975 2009 Lithuania 1992 2009
Austria 1975 2009 Macedonia 1994 2009
Azerbaijan 1996 2009 Madagascar 1975 2001
Bahrain 1975 2009 Malawi 1975 2009
Bangladesh 1975 2009 Malaysia 1976 2009
Belarus 1992 2009 Mali 1975 2007
Belgium 1975 2009 Mauritania 1975 2009
Benin 1975 2009 Mexico 1975 2009
Bhutan 1975 2009 Moldova 1992 2009
Bolivia 1975 2009 Mongolia 1975 2009
Bosnia and Herze-
govina
1996 2009 Montenegro 2007 2009
Botswana 1975 2009 Morocco 1975 2009
Brazil 1978 2009 Mozambique 1976 2009
Bulgaria 1975 2009 Myanmar 1993 2004
Continued on next page
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Table A1: Countries and years covered in the analysis
country min(year) max(year) country min(year) max(year)
Burundi 1975 2009 Namibia 1991 2009
Cambodia 1976 2009 Nepal 1975 2009
Cameroon 1975 2009 New Zealand 1975 2009
Canada 1975 2009 Nicaragua 1975 2009
Central African Re-
public
1975 2009 Niger 1975 2009
Chad 1975 2005 Nigeria 1975 2009
Chile 1975 2009 Pakistan 1978 2004
China 1977 2009 Panama 1975 2009
Congo 1975 2009 Paraguay 1975 2009
Costa Rica 1975 2009 Peru 1975 2007
Croatia 1994 2009 Poland 1975 2009
Czechoslovakia 1975 1992 Romania 1975 2009
Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo
1975 2009 Russia 1975 1999
Djibouti 1978 2009 Rwanda 1975 2009
Ecuador 1975 2009 Saudi Arabia 1975 2009
Egypt 1975 2009 Senegal 1975 2009
El Salvador 1975 2009 Sierra Leone 1975 2009
Eritrea 1994 2009 Slovakia 1994 2009
Estonia 1992 2009 Slovenia 1993 2009
Ethiopia 1993 1998 South Africa 1989 2009
Fiji 1975 2009 Spain 1975 2009
Finland 1975 2009 Sri Lanka 1975 2004
France 1975 2009 Sudan 1975 1983
Gabon 1975 2009 Switzerland 1975 2009
Gambia 1975 1993 Syria 1975 2009
Georgia 1994 2009 Taiwan 1975 2009
Continued on next page
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Table A1: Countries and years covered in the analysis
country min(year) max(year) country min(year) max(year)
Ghana 1975 2009 Tajikistan 1992 2009
Greece 1975 2009 Tanzania 1975 2009
Guatemala 1996 2009 Thailand 1983 2003
Guinea 1975 2009 Togo 1975 2009
Guinea-Bissau 1975 2009 Trinidad and To-
bago
1975 2009
Guyana 1975 2009 Turkey 1975 1984
Honduras 1975 2009 Turkmenistan 1992 2009
Hungary 1975 2009 Uganda 1975 1993
India 1975 1979 Ukraine 1992 2009
Indonesia 1975 2009 United Kingdom 1992 2009
Iran 1975 2005 United States of
America
1975 2003
Iraq 1997 2004 Uruguay 2006 2009
Israel 2000 2000 Uzbekistan 1992 2009
Italy 1975 2009 Venezuela 1975 2009
Ivory Coast 1975 2009 Vietnam 1975 2009
Japan 1975 2009 Yemen 1991 2009
Jordan 1975 2009 Yemen Arab Re-
public
1975 1989
Kazakhstan 1992 2009 Yugoslavia 1975 2002
Kenya 1975 2009 Zambia 1975 2009
Kuwait 1975 2009 Zimbabwe 1980 2009
A3
Table A2: Descriptive statistics
N minimum maximum mean variance
Inclusive institutions 4104 -0.20 7.37 0.02 0.69
Dispersive institutions 4104 -0.78 2.10 0.07 0.86
De facto inclusion 4104 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.15
Log(GDP Per Capita) 4104 2.07 4.90 3.54 0.31
Log(Population) 4104 5.40 9.12 7.06 0.43
Prior conflicts 4104 0.00 22.00 1.57 6.72
British colony 4104 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.16
French colony 4104 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.15
Institution missing data 4104 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.25
Ethnic civil war onset 4104 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.03
Ethnic civil war onset infigthing 4104 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Ethnic civil war onset against excl. group 4104 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
Peace Years ethnic conflict 4104 0.00 63.00 24.88 372.96
Peace Years ethnic conflict2 4104 0.00 3969.00 991.72 1173290.34
Peace Years ethnic conflict3 4104 0.00 250047.00 44639.58 3754992762.83
Peace Years ethnic territorial conflict 4104 0.00 63.00 29.46 347.86
Peace Years ethnic territorial conflict2 4104 0.00 3969.00 1215.50 1224314.49
Peace Years ethnic territorial conflict2 4104 0.00 250047.00 55516.20 4160614907.69
Autonomous Population Share 4104 0.00 0.56 0.02 0.00
Figure A1 shows the distribution of inclusive and dispersive powersharing
in both democracies and autocracies. We introduce this figure to show that
powersharing institutions vary widely within regime type – it is not simply the
case that democracies have high levels of powersharing and autocracies have low
levels.
The top portion of Figure A1 shows that most countries lack inclusive power-
sharing institutions of any kind – institutions such as reserved legislative seats for
minority groups are quite rare. Importantly, the figure also shows that substan-
tial numbers of both democratic and autocratic country years with high levels of
inclusive powersharing, and the mean level of powersharing is similar across the
two groups.
Looking at dispersive powersharing, we see substantially higher levels among
democracies. However, the existence of a substantial number of democracies with
low levels of dispersive powersharing and a substantial number of autocracies with
A4
high levels of dispersive powersharing shows that dispersive powersharing is not
simply a characteristic of democracies – it is a set of institutional arrangements
that can be and is present in both democracies or autocracies.28
28To divide the sample between democracies and autocracies we use a binary
version of the x-polity data from Vreeland (2008).
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Appendix B: Sensitivity analyses
For the results of our main analyses to be unbiased the “sequential ignorability”
assumption has to hold. Imai et al. (2011, 770) present this assumption as follows:
First, given the observed pretreatment confounders, the treatment as-
signment is assumed to be ignorable – statistically independent of po-
tential outcomes and potential mediators. This part of the assumption
is often called no-omitted-variable-bias, exogeneity, or unconfounded-
ness. . . . The second part . . . implies that the observed mediator is
ignorable given the actual treatment status and pretreatment con-
founders.
The degree to which our observational study violates these demands is diffi-
cult to assess. As suggested by Imai et al. (2011) we assess how our estimated
mediated effect would change as a function of the correlation term of the errors
of our two equations. Figures B1 and B2 depict the results of these sensitivity
analyses for the mediated effect of inclusive, respectively dispersive institutions.
As the figures show, our results are potentially sensitive to the omission of a con-
founder that would influence both power-sharing practices and conflict onsets. If
the omitted confounder induces a particular relationship among the error terms in
these two equations, this would render our estimated mediated effect insignificant
or even inverse its sign. However, the figures also demonstrate that the opposite
is also possible, such that possible biases actually weakened our results. As we
have no way of resolving this question empirically, we draw on extant theory to
infer which direction a possible bias is likely to take. As it turns out (detailed
below), we have good reason to be confident in our results, which are likely to be
conservative estimates.
B1
Regarding inclusive power-sharing and infighting, Figure B1 shows that our
estimated positive mediated effect would survive as long as the correlation of the
error terms falls within the range of -1 to approximately 0.2. Following Roessler
(2011, 2016), governments tend to exclude other groups in their government
when there is a high risk of infighting. In other words, expected infighting should
plausibly lead to less inclusion, and thus a negative correlation coefficient for the
error terms.
Regarding inclusive power-sharing and a conflict against excluded groups, our
negative mediated effect remains positive as long the error correlation is above
-0.1. Again, Roessler’s (2011, 2016) argument suggests that governments are
particularly likely to exclude groups where there this is least “risky,” i.e. where
governments can get away with exclusion. Thus, expectations of a conflict should
lead to more inclusion both de jure and de facto, resulting in a positive correlation
in the error terms.
Finally, for dispersive institutions the results of the sensitivity analysis de-
picted in Figure B2 suggests that the negative mediated effect of these institu-
tions on ethnic or ethnic territorial conflict depends on a error correlation that is
positive. The argument and the empirical results presented by Cederman et al.
(2015) regarding regional autonomy suggest that governments offer such conces-
sions to stave off potential conflict. This, however, would again make a positive
correlation among the error terms more plausible.
In sum, for each of our analyses extant theory suggests that we can be rea-
sonably confident that our results are conservative.
B2
Figure B1: Sensitivity analyses for mediated effect of inclusive power-sharing












































































































































Appendix C: Additional analyses
In this appendix we report the results of a series of additional analyses. First,
in Table C1 we report the results of a multinomial probit model (Imai & van
Dyk 2005a, Imai & van Dyk 2005b) to take into account that infighting and
conflict with an excluded group are competing risks due to inclusive institutions.
As the table shows, taking these competing risks into account barely affects the
results presented in Table 1 in the main text. Second, we report results from
models that consider the moderating effect of practices on institutions by adding
interaction terms in Tables C2 and C3 . Third, Tables C4, C5 and C6 display our
main analyses (see tables 1 and 2) with the X-Polity variable by Vreeland (2008)
as an additional controk. Finally, we report results from replications of our main
analyses (see tables 1 and 2), but split the sample in observations without prior
conflict and those without (see tables C7, C8 and C9).
Following up in subsequent sections we assess the robustness of the results
of our mediation analyses by adding additional control variables and lagging our
main explanatory variables to alleviate endogeneity concerns.
C1
Table C1: Inclusive institutions and ethnic conflict among power-sharing partners
and against excluded groups
Infighting Rebellion by Excluded
(Intercept) -0.345 -0.214
(1.453) (1.156)
Inclusive PS 0.018 0.021
(0.067) (0.096)
Included share of ethnic groups 1.126 -0.754
(0.336) (0.215)




Prior Conflicts 0.054 0.011
(0.044) (0.030)
Peace Years 0.017 -0.031
(0.043) (0.033)
Peace Years2 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Peace Years3 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Institution missing data 0.175 0.142
(0.243) (0.160)
British Colony -1.910 -0.255
(0.678) (0.229)









Standard errors in parentheses
1000 burnins, 5000 MCMC draws thinned by 5
C2
Table C2: Models with interactions: inclusive power-sharing
ethnic conflict infighting conflict against excl. group
constant −2.513∗ −0.701 −0.544
(0.691) (1.981) (1.104)
Inclusive PS 0.035 0.259 0.121
(0.093) (0.192) (0.110)
Included PS Pop. Share −0.021 1.174∗ −0.716∗
(0.134) (0.356) (0.319)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.292∗ −0.451 −0.339∗
(0.100) (0.247) (0.166)
Log(Population) 0.209∗ −0.177 −0.085
(0.080) (0.254) (0.130)
Prior Conflicts 0.076∗ 0.075 0.013
(0.014) (0.056) (0.028)
Institution missing data 0.119 0.054 0.148
(0.096) (0.264) (0.153)
British Colony −0.200 −4.238 −0.176
(0.127) (202.273) (0.217)
French Colony 0.082 −0.590∗ 0.303
(0.128) (0.284) (0.175)
Included PS Pop. Share * Inclusive PS −0.023 −0.337 −0.934
(0.146) (0.265) (1.297)
Peace Years −0.018 0.026 −0.020
(0.020) (0.050) (0.030)
Peace Years2 0.001 −0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Peace Years3 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 4104 4104 4104
AIC 955.700 155.678 369.151
BIC 1284.326 484.304 697.776
logL −425.850 −25.839 −132.575
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
C3
Table C3: Models with interactions: dispersive power-sharing
ethnic conflict ethnic, terr. conflict
constant −2.543∗ −3.878∗
(0.748) (0.991)
Dispersive PS −3.271∗ −2.843
(1.533) (1.649)
Autonomous Pop. Share 0.036 0.065
(0.065) (0.084)




Prior Conflicts 0.082∗ 0.057∗
(0.014) (0.016)
Institution missing data 0.146 0.116
(0.100) (0.131)
British Colony −0.285∗ −0.153
(0.128) (0.156)
French Colony 0.020 0.012
(0.122) (0.181)
Autonomous Pop. Share * Dispersive PS 1.862 1.640
(1.063) (1.131)
Peace Years −0.001 −0.024
(0.020) (0.025)
Peace Years2 −0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)






Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
C4
Table C4: Inclusive institutions and ethnic conflict, controlling for democracy
inclusion ethnic civil war
constant 0.716∗ −2.303∗
(0.086) (0.728)
Inclusive PS 0.092∗ 0.073
(0.009) (0.067)




Prior Conflicts −0.002 0.073∗
(0.003) (0.014)
Peace Years 0.011∗ −0.023
(0.002) (0.021)
Peace Years2 −0.000∗ 0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
Peace Years3 0.000∗ −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Institution missing data −0.052∗ 0.085
(0.012) (0.103)
British Colony 0.219∗ −0.206
(0.015) (0.131)
French Colony 0.368∗ 0.092
(0.017) (0.137)
Democracy (xpolity) 0.012∗ 0.002
(0.001) (0.013)









Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
C5
Table C5: Inclusive institutions, ethnic conflict and infighting, controlling for
democracy
inclusion infighting conflict against excl. group
constant 0.716∗ 0.802 −0.309
(0.086) (2.250) (1.168)
Inclusive PS 0.092∗ −0.093 0.078
(0.009) (0.170) (0.105)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.035∗ −0.935∗ −0.255
(0.013) (0.345) (0.175)
Log(Population) −0.061∗ −0.109 −0.130
(0.010) (0.286) (0.136)
Prior Conflicts −0.002 −0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.082) (0.030)
Peace Years 0.011∗ −0.008 −0.030
(0.002) (0.058) (0.032)
Peace Years2 −0.000∗ 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
Peace Years3 0.000∗ −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institution missing data −0.052∗ −0.296 0.019
(0.012) (0.326) (0.160)
British Colony 0.219∗ −4.638 −0.117
(0.015) (304.251) (0.217)
French Colony 0.368∗ −0.658∗ 0.214
(0.017) (0.321) (0.188)
Democracy (xpolity) 0.012∗ −0.002 −0.038
(0.001) (0.037) (0.021)
Included PS Pop. Share 1.173∗ −0.640∗
(0.389) (0.251)







Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
C6
Table C6: Dispersive institutions and ethnic conflict, controlling for democracy
autonomy ethnic conflict autonomy territorial conflict
constant −0.059∗ −2.142∗ −0.068∗ −3.822∗
(0.019) (0.774) (0.019) (1.030)
Dispersive PS 0.008∗ 0.087 0.009∗ 0.088
(0.002) (0.069) (0.002) (0.088)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.008∗ −0.361∗ −0.005∗ −0.296∗
(0.002) (0.114) (0.002) (0.145)
Log(Population) 0.012∗ 0.199∗ 0.013∗ 0.392∗
(0.002) (0.089) (0.002) (0.113)
Prior Conflicts 0.005∗ 0.077∗ 0.005∗ 0.061∗
(0.001) (0.015) (0.001) (0.017)
Peace Years 0.002∗ −0.010
(0.000) (0.021)
Peace Years2 −0.000∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
Peace Years3 0.000∗ −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Institution missing data 0.000 0.116 −0.001 0.135
(0.002) (0.106) (0.002) (0.138)
British Colony −0.013∗ −0.280∗ −0.014∗ −0.159
(0.003) (0.133) (0.003) (0.165)
French Colony −0.007∗ 0.043 −0.007∗ 0.093
(0.003) (0.129) (0.003) (0.187)
Democracy (xpolity) 0.001∗ 0.004 0.001∗ 0.017
(0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.018)
Autonomous Pop. Share −1.198 −1.004
(0.763) (0.833)
Peace Years 0.002∗ −0.027
(0.001) (0.026)
Peace Years2 −0.000∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.001)
Peace Years3 0.000∗ −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
N 3912 3912 3912 3912
R2 0.107 0.099
adj. R2 0.104 0.096




Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
C7
Table C7: Inclusive institutions and ethnic conflict, pre- and post-war observa-
tions
pre-conflict post-conflict
inclusion ethnic conflict inclusion ethnic conflict
constant 0.661∗ −0.862 1.098∗ −3.503∗
(0.141) (1.555) (0.097) (0.774)
Inclusive PS 0.165∗ 0.178 0.071∗ 0.001
(0.016) (0.163) (0.007) (0.058)
Log(GDP p.c.) 0.045∗ −0.746∗ −0.087∗ −0.309∗
(0.020) (0.299) (0.014) (0.112)
Log(Population) −0.066∗ 0.228 −0.090∗ 0.396∗
(0.017) (0.197) (0.011) (0.086)
Peace Years −0.003 −0.107 0.013∗ −0.010
(0.006) (0.067) (0.003) (0.025)
Peace Years2 −0.000 0.005 −0.000∗ −0.001
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002)
Peace Years3 0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institution missing data −0.116∗ 0.214 −0.052∗ 0.073
(0.019) (0.248) (0.014) (0.107)
British Colony 0.057∗ −4.074 0.306∗ 0.056
(0.027) (191.400) (0.017) (0.126)
French Colony 0.238∗ 0.003 0.398∗ 0.018
(0.032) (0.291) (0.018) (0.153)
Included PS Pop. Share 0.087 −0.104
(0.281) (0.161)
N 1740 1740 2364 2364
R2 0.110 0.356
adj. R2 0.105 0.353




Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
C8
Table C8: Inclusive institutions, ethnic conflict and infighting, pre- and post-war
observations
pre-conflict post-conflict
conflict against conflict against
inclusion infighting excl. group inclusion infighting excl. group
constant 0.661∗ 2.415 −22.277 1.098∗ −1.740 0.074
(0.141) (4.491) (1852.503) (0.097) (2.464) (1.361)
Inclusive PS 0.165∗ 0.155 −112.065 0.071∗ 0.002 0.030
(0.016) (0.515) (9378.819) (0.007) (0.097) (0.091)
Log(GDP p.c.) 0.045∗ −0.367 −0.705 −0.087∗ −0.315 −0.261
(0.020) (0.632) (0.429) (0.014) (0.281) (0.194)
Log(Population) −0.066∗ −0.579 −0.003 −0.090∗ −0.093 −0.198
(0.017) (0.615) (0.263) (0.011) (0.286) (0.163)
Peace Years −0.003 −0.074 −0.079 0.013∗ 0.026 0.013
(0.006) (0.137) (0.087) (0.003) (0.063) (0.045)
Peace Years2 −0.000 0.003 0.004 −0.000∗ −0.000 −0.002
(0.000) (0.006) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003)
Peace Years3 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institution missing data −0.116∗ −0.336 0.465 −0.052∗ 0.229 0.074
(0.019) (0.624) (0.381) (0.014) (0.340) (0.177)
British Colony 0.057∗ −4.075 −4.510 0.306∗ −4.542 0.084
(0.027) (464.626) (3476.075) (0.017) (261.706) (0.236)
French Colony 0.238∗ 0.160 0.098 0.398∗ −0.977∗ 0.344
(0.032) (0.612) (0.370) (0.018) (0.375) (0.211)
Included PS Pop. Share 0.640 −0.121 1.555∗ −0.851∗
(0.631) (0.392) (0.465) (0.282)
N 1740 1740 1740 2364 2364 2364
R2 0.110 0.356
adj. R2 0.105 0.353
Resid. sd 0.380 0.301
AIC 47.728 106.096 120.377 271.340
BIC 288.040 346.409 374.173 525.137
logL 20.136 −9.048 −16.188 −91.670
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
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Table C9: Dispersive institutions and ethnic conflict, pre- and post-war observa-
tions
pre-conflict post-conflict
ethnic terr. ethnic conflict
autonomy conflict conflict autonomy conflict conflict
constant 0.028 −0.763 −6.438 −0.191∗ −3.535∗ −3.475∗
(0.017) (1.716) (3.344) (0.027) (0.808) (1.085)
Dispersive PS −0.001 0.040 −0.258 0.018∗ 0.020 0.094
(0.001) (0.177) (0.275) (0.002) (0.069) (0.087)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.007∗ −0.668∗ −0.428 −0.004 −0.226∗ −0.341∗
(0.002) (0.302) (0.482) (0.004) (0.113) (0.145)
Log(Population) −0.000 0.170 0.824∗ 0.032∗ 0.372∗ 0.423∗
(0.002) (0.203) (0.379) (0.003) (0.091) (0.113)
Peace Years −0.000 −0.109 −0.154 −0.000 −0.005 −0.028
(0.001) (0.067) (0.119) (0.001) (0.021) (0.025)
Peace Years2 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Peace Years3 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institution missing data 0.002 0.277 0.262 −0.001 0.102 0.071
(0.002) (0.256) (0.365) (0.004) (0.110) (0.143)
British Colony −0.006 −3.978 −3.820 −0.025∗ −0.017 0.045
(0.003) (195.240) (286.811) (0.004) (0.124) (0.148)
French Colony 0.006 −0.007 −0.045 −0.012∗ −0.058 −0.068
(0.003) (0.285) (0.501) (0.005) (0.145) (0.218)
Autonomous Pop. Share −11.092 −0.779 −0.828 −0.586
(14.320) (6.790) (0.717) (0.831)
N 1740 1740 1740 2364 2364 2364
R2 0.058 0.149
adj. R2 0.053 0.146
Resid. sd 0.041 0.078
AIC 183.372 94.945 792.316 514.096
BIC 423.684 335.257 1046.112 767.893
logL −47.686 −3.472 −352.158 −213.048
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
C10
Replicating Results from Mediation Analysis with Addi-
tional Controls
In the following sections, we replicate the main mediation analysis from the body
of the paper (i.e Figures 3 & 5) while adding a range of additional control vari-
ables. In the analyses in the body of the paper, we control for GDP per capita
and population (both logged), colonial origin, polynomials of the time since the
most recent conflict, and a dummy variable for whether any of the underlying
indicators in the IDC data are missing for that observation. In these analyses we
add additional controls in batches – we do not add all of the additional controls
into the model together to avoid multicollinearity problems and because a num-
ber of the additional control variables have substantial numbers of missing values,
which reduces the sample size. Each figure in this section produces a series of
plots, the first of which reproduces the results from the primary specification in
body of the paper, with subsequent plots adding in batches of additional control
variables. We add additional controls for: fuel dependence (% of GDP, from
Ross (2013)) and state capacity (an aggregation of 24 variables capturing admin-
istrative and coercive capacity, from Hanson & Sigman (2013)); economic growth
and inequality (World Development Indicators); conflicts in neighboring countries
(sum of all Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPVs) in neighboring states,
from (Marshall 2012); dummy variable for a religious government (Cruz, Keefer
& Scartascini 2016) and dummy variables geographic region; and type of prior
civil conflict, where we control for three characteristics: whether the war was a
separatist conflict (Themnér & Wallensteen 2012), whether it resulted in a peace
settlement (Sarkees & Wayman 2010), and whether international peacekeepers
were involved (Fortna 2008). Drawing on the IDC and EPR-ETH powersharing
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datasets, we also add controls for the level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization in
the country and for whether there has been a recent change in the level of de jure
powersharing29.
The control for fuel dependence reflects the concern that resource dependence
may make civil conflict more likely and may also alter the incentives to adopt
specific types of powersharing arrangements, particularly depending on the ge-
ographic location of natural resource wealth relative to where different ethnic
groups reside within the country. State capacity may related to the resource
curse in some cases, and may affect the probability of conflict directly. Simi-
larly, powersharing may require a certain level of state capacity to be successfully
adopted.
Economic growth and inequality may potentially affect both conflict outcomes
and powersharing adoption. Conflict in neighboring countries is controlled for be-
cause conflicts sometimes diffuse across borders. While the link between neigh-
boring conflicts and powersharing adoption is less clear, we acknowledge that such
effects are possible. We control for the nature of past conflict as this may both
shape the likelihood of recurrence and the likelihood of powersharing adoption.
Similarly, both conflict and powersharing adoption may vary across religious and
non-religious governments and different regions of the world. Powersharing and
conflict may both be more likely in countries with higher levels of ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, and recent changes in powersharing may indicate both less in-
stitutional stability and a higher probability of conflict onset.
29This variable takes a value of one if there has been a year-to-year change of
at least .5 standard deviations in either inclusive or dispersive powersharing at
any time in the past five years and zero otherwise.
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Replicating effects of inclusive powersharing on ethnic conflict onset
(infighting)
In Figure C1 we test the robustness of the results linking inclusive powersharing
to infighting between ethnic groups in power (i.e. the upper plot in Figure 3
in the main paper). The primary finding with respect to infighting in the body
of the paper is that the indirect effect of inclusive powersharing is to increase
infighting, and that result is robust across all sets of alternative controls. The es-
timates of the mediated effect (ACME) are consistent across specifications. The
direct effect of de jure inclusive powersharing and is not statistically significant
in the primary specification, and varies in sign with different sets of controls. In
a number of specifications the direct effect (and hence also the total effect) are
estimated extremely imprecisely, primarily due to reduced sample sizes, though
it is estimated to be positive in all specifications. The key takeaway from Fig-
ure C1 is that, even though several batches of controls reduce the precision of
estimation, the positive indirect effect of inclusive powersharing on infighting is
robust, further increasing our confidence in Hypothesis 1b.
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Figure C1: Replicating Effects of Inclusive Powersharing on Ethnic Conflict Onset
(infighting): Additional Controls.
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Replicating effects of inclusive powersharing on ethnic conflict onset
(conflict with excluded groups)
Figure C2 probes the robustness of our findings in support of H1a, which predicts
that the indirect effect of inclusive powersharing is to reduce conflict between
the government and excluded groups. Consistent with the results in Figure 3
in the main paper, we estimate a negative and statistically significant indirect
effect (ACME) across all specifications. Neither the direct effect or total effect
estimated is statistically significant in either the primary specification or in any of
the alternative specifications. These results lend further support to Hypothesis
1a. While the indirect effect of inclusive powersharing is to increase the risk
fighting between parties in government, it reduces the probability of conflict with
excluded groups.
C15
−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Original Effects of Inclusive Powersharing 








−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Add Additional Controls for Fuel Dependence and State Capacity 








−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Add Additional Controls for GDP Growth and Inequality 








−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Add Additional Controls for Conflicts in Neighbors 








−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Add Additional Controls for Religion 








−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Add Additional Controls for Civil War Types 








−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Add Additional Controls for Ethno−Linguistic Fractionalization 








−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
Add Additional Controls for Recent De Jure Powersharing Change 








Figure C2: Replicating Effects of Inclusive Powersharing on Conflict with Ex-
cluded Groups: Additional Controls.
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Replicating effects of dispersive powersharing on ethnic conflict
In the primary specification (Figure 5 in the main text, upper left plot in Figure
C3), we find support for the expectation that dispersive powersharing has an
indirect negative effect on ethnic conflict by increasing regional autonomy for mi-
norities. We estimate that the direct and total effects of dispersive powersharing
are positive, but these estimates are not statistically significant. These results
are reasonably robust.
When controlling for the nature of the prior civil war or the religious make-up
of the country, the negative mediated effect we estimate slips just below statistical
significance, while remaining similar in magnitude to the primary specification.
The direct and total effects, which are positive but statistically insignificant in
the primary specification, are also positive and insignificant in the alternative
specifications.
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Figure C3: Replicating Effects of Dispersive Powersharing on Ethnic Conflict:
Additional Controls.
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Replicating effects of dispersive powersharing on ethnic territorial con-
flict
In the main text (Figure 5) we estimate a negative but statistically insignificant
mediated effect (ACME) of dispersive powersharing on territorial ethnic conflict,
and positive but statistically insignificant direct (ADE) and total effects. Figure
C4 subjects these estimates to the same battery of robustness tests as our other
results, and the findings are consistent. All estimated effects are insignificant,
but consistent in sign with the primary specification.
C19
−0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Original Effects of Dispersive Powersharing 








−0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Add Additional Controls for Fuel Dependence and State Capacity 








−0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Add Additional Controls for GDP Growth and Inequality 








−0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Add Additional Controls for Conflicts in Neighbors 








−0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Add Additional Controls for Religion 








−0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Add Additional Controls for Civil War Types 








−0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Add Additional Controls for Ethno−Linguistic Fractionalization 








−0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
Add Additional Controls for Recent De Jure Powersharing Change 








Figure C4: Replicating Effects of Dispersive Powersharing on Ethnic Territorial
Conflict: Additional Controls.
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Varying lags of independent variables
The figures in this section replicate the core mediation analyses from the main
paper (Figures 3 & 5) while varying the lags of the independent variables. Both
the IDC data and the EPR data are coded as of January 1 of a given year. In the
primary specifications in the paper, which do not lag the independent variables,
we are using powersharing institutions and practices as of January 1 to predict
conflict onsets in the entire calendar year. Thus, the independent variables in
the primary analysis are temporally prior to the dependent variable. However,
because the onset of conflict is sometimes predictable based on events months,
or even a couple of years, prior to the onset of actual fighting, is is possible that
powersharing institutions and behaviors are sometimes shaped by conflicts that
are about to start, but have not yet started. Such anticipation introduces the
possibility of reverse causation into our analysis. If we are able to show that our
results are robust to lagging the independent variables by several years, we are
able to show that such anticipation is unlikely to be driving our results.
Each figure in this section contains four plots. The upper-left plot repro-
duces the results reported in the main text, while the remaining three plots
replicate these results while lagging all independent variables by one, three, and
five years. Across all the analyses in this section, we see that lagging the indepen-
dent variables affects our results very little and does not change their substantive
interpretation.
Figure C5 probes the robustness of Hypothesis 1b, which asserts that inclusive
powersharing institutions increases the risk of infighting between ethnic groups
in the governing coalition by increasing the share of ethnic groups that are repre-
sented in government. These results are remarkably stable as we increase the lag
on the independent variables by one, three and five years. Most importantly, in all
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Figure C5: Replicating Effects of Inclusive Powersharing on Ethnic Conflict Onset
(infighting): Varying Lags.
specifications we estimate a positive and statistically significant mediated effect
(ACME). This increases our confidence that the support we find for Hypothesis
1b is not driven by reverse causation.
The total effect is also estimated to be positive in all specifications, though
with the additional lags this result is just short of statistical significance.
Figure C6 tests the robustness of Hypothesis 1a, which predicts that inclusive
powersharing institutions decrease the risk of conflict between the government
and excluded groups by increasing the share of ethnic groups that are included
in government. Again, these results are stable as the lags are varied. In all
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Figure C6: Replicating Effects of Inclusive Powersharing on Conflict with Ex-
cluded Groups: Varying Lags.
specifications we estimate a negative and statistically significant mediated effect
(ACME) of inclusive powersharing on conflict with excluded groups.
Figure C7 and Figure C8 probe the robustness of Hypothesis 2, which as-
serts that dispersive powersharing institutions decrease the risk of ethnic conflict
by increasing the share of ethnic groups that enjoy regional autonomy. Figure
C7 replicates the results examining the effect on ethnic conflict and Figure C8
replicates the results examining ethnic territorial conflict.
The estimated effects in C7 are consistent in sign and similar in magnitude as
we increase the lags, but the negative mediated effect (ACME) that we estimate,
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Figure C7: Replicating Effects of Dispersive Powersharing on Ethnic Conflict:
Varying Lags.
while statistically significant in the primary specification, falls from significance
as the length of the lag on the independent variables is increased. Thus, these
results remain consistent with Hypothesis 2, but these findings are not as robust
as those for H1a and H1b.
The estimated mediated effect of dispersive powersharing on ethnic territorial
conflict is in the expected direction but short of statistical significance in the
primary specification in the main text (Figure 5); Figure C7 shows that this
estimated effect also falls short of statistical significance as the lag increases.
Notably, in the primary specifications (Figure 5, main text and upper left
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Figure C8: Replicating Effects of Dispersive Powersharing on Ethnic Territorial
Conflict: Varying Lags.
plot, Figures C7 & C8, we estimated direct effects and total effects that are sub-
stantively large, but not statistically significant. In Figure C7, these positive
effects are statistically significant with a three year lag. This serves as a useful
reminder that, in the case of dispersive powersharing, the direct effect and medi-
ated effects go in different directions. Our results suggest that de jure dispersive
powersharing decreases the risk of conflict by granting regional autonomy to more
groups, but the direct effect of these de jure institutions, which grant more power
to regional governments in general, may actually lead to an overall increase the
risk of ethnic conflict and ethnic territorial conflict.
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